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I. INTRODUCTION
The following comments are divided into four sections.1 The first revolves
around my experiences as Reporter for the project that developed the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA).' Mississippi, of course, faithfully
followed this statute when it revised its corporation statutes in 1988. As a result, a
good part of the Mississippi corporation statute was indirectly drafted by me or
under my direct supervision.
The second section involves reflections on why some states decide to adopt the
RMBCA while others "go it alone" and develop their own corporation statutes
with their own resources. Section three involves my views on the relationship be-
tween the RMBCA and the Corporate Governance Project that has been under
consideration by the American Law Institute for nearly ten years. The final sec-
tion addresses a limited number of substantive questions about the RMBCA and
the Mississippi Business Corporation Act. I hope that you will find my comments
to be interesting and useful.
1. Portions of these comments are drawn from Elliott Goldstein & Robert W. Hamilton, The Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, 38 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1983); Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 Thx. L.
REv. 1455 (1985).
2. At the September, 1990, meeting of the Committee on Corporate Laws, it was decided to drop the word
"Revised" from the name of this statute, and in the future it will be referred to simply as the "Model Business
Corporation Act." However, in this article, the older name, Revised Model Business Corporation Act will be
used to distinguish it from the earlier 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1969 versions of the same Act.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RMBCA
A. The RMBCA is "Model"Legislation
There are two major sources of uniform legislation in the United States today:
the American Law Institute (ALl) and the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The RMBCA is not the creation of either of these organizations but rather
of a committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) called the Committee on
Corporate Laws. I believe it is the only model or uniform statute promulgated by
the ABA in the business area,3 outside, of course, of codes of professional respon-
sibility and ethics. The reason for the ABA's involvement in the corporate law area
is, I think, mostly an historical accident. It is, however, impossible to tell because
there is almost nothing written or published on the activities of the Committee on
Corporate Laws before 1950, the year the first version of the Model Business Cor-
poration Act (MBCA) was published. We do know that the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgated a "Uniform Business Corporation Act" in the
late 1920s that never really caught on. This statute remained on the books until the
early 1950s, at which time it was withdrawn when it became apparent that states
were following the 1950 or 1955 versions of the Model Act.
There is a difference between a "model" statute such as the RMBCA and "uni-
form" statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act that are promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
often with the advice and assistance of the ALI. The latter are intended to be en-
acted by each state in their entirety in order to develop a set of uniform principles to
govern transactions wherever they are undertaken in the United States. A "model"
statute, on the other hand, specifically encourages states to consider local prac-
tices and local considerations, deviating from the "model" when they feel it appro-
priate. Certainly it was the intention of the Committee on Corporate Laws, when
it developed the RMBCA, to encourage local variations when that was felt appro-
priate. Indeed, it was realized that many states have state constitutional provisions
that would prevent the enactment of the RMBCA in its entirety.
Thus, changes made by Mississippi from the language of the RMBCA-e.g.,
the inclusion of an alternative constituencies provision 4- is entirely consistent
with the basic concept of the RMBCA being a "model."'
3. The Section on Business Law of the ABA has also promulgated a Model Non-Profit Corporation Act that
is closely patterned after the RMBCA.
4. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (1972). Because the Mississippi Business Corporation Act numeration
is so closely tied to that of the RMBCA, I will use only the RMBCA numeration in the balance of this article.
5. But see Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2253 (1990). In this particular case, the Committee has expressed serious reservations about the desirabil-
ity of such provisions and decided not to include an alternative constituencies provision in the RMBCA. This
decision was made despite the fact that about thirty states have adopted alternative constituency statutes.
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B. The Committee on Corporate Laws
The Committee on Corporate Laws, which is part of the Section of Business
Law of the ABA, has complete control over the RMBCA. This Committee is
unique in several respects:
(1) Its membership is limited to about thirty-five members and appointment is for
six year terms and by invitation only. One cannot voluntarily become a member of
the Committee and one cannot generally stay on the Committee forever (though
former chairmen are often accorded the honor of what is in effect, life membership).
(2) The Committee's decisions with respect to the RMBCA are not subject to re-
view by the board of directors of the Section of Business Law or by the Board of
Governors of the ABA. Proposed amendments are developed by the Committee (by
the process described below) and published in The Business Lawyer for comment.
After reviewing any comments that are received, the Committee simply promul-
gates the final text of the amendments and publishes them in The Business Lawyer.
6
(3) It is a working Committee that meets four times a year and decisions are made
only after extensive oral discussions by the Committee acting as a body. Meetings of
the Committee are generally scheduled for Friday afternoons and Saturday morn-
ings. They are held around the country, often at expensive hotels or spas. Attendance
is unusually good: I do not remember a meeting at which less than fifteen members
were present, and it was not uncommon to have twenty-five to thirty members
present. Of course, this method of decision-making is practical largely because of
the size of the Committee.
Anyone who has participated in a typical ABA Committee with hundreds of
members, written distributions in lieu of meetings, little member participation,
and virtually total reliance on the Chairperson of the Committee to develop pro-
posals, will know that all of this is unusual.
The membership of the Committee is drawn from senior members of the corpo-
rate bar from across the country. There are traditionally one or two members of
the corporate plaintiffs' bar and two or three corporate law professors; the balance
of the Committee consists of practicing corporate defense lawyers. Two or three
may be inside general counsels of large, publicly held corporations, but the great
bulk of them are in private practice. There are also usually one or more lawyers
from smaller cities or towns, but the backbone of the Committee is the senior cor-
porate lawyer from the very large firms in the major cities of the United States.
Membership decisions are made by the Chairman, usually after consulting with
the Committee as a whole. Selections are made to assure geographic diversity so
that at any one time there are senior lawyers on the Committee who are knowl-
edgeable about the corporation statutes of perhaps fifteen or so different states, in-
cluding all of the important commercial states.
6. The Committee on Corporate Laws also prepares studies and reports from time to time. Perhaps the best
known of these is the Corporate Director's Guidebook. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's
Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591 (1978). These studies and reports are submitted to the Council of the Section of
Business Law and the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association for approval before they are promul-
gated.
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A fair description of the composition of this Committee is that it has represen-
tation of the principal groups that are interested in the development of corporation
law, but it is not diversified and representational in the normal senses of those
words. The membership is predominantly over fifty years of age and male (though
there is a scattering of younger lawyers and women). Members' background is pre-
dominately successful corporate practice in the largest firms in.the United States.
Unquestionably, the great strength of the Committee is the quality of the mem-
bers: they are bright individuals, seasoned with twenty years' or more experience
in corporate law, and, by-and-large, interested in the Committee discussions and
the work product of the Committee. I was privileged to serve on the Committee
from 1976 through 1982, and I know that I learned a great deal listening to the
Committee discussions; indeed, one rapidly gained humility (if one did not previ-
ously have it) when participating in the discussions with these bright and articulate
lawyers.
C. Why Was the RMBCA Produced When it Was?
The original Model Business Corporation Act was published in 1950, and after
a rather slow start, the 1955, 1960, and 1969 versions achieved a considerable de-
gree of popularity. By the end of the 1970s, it had been used as the model for the
recodification of state corporation statutes in some thirty-odd states and had a
strong influence on the statutes of a number of additional states. In other words the
old MBCA was a highly successful Model Act.
There are several reasons - two major and the rest minor - for the decision in
1979 to develop an entirely new model statute. The first major reason was that a
large number of significant amendments to the MBCA had been developed and
approved during the 1970s. These amendments were developed by different sub-
committees and different individuals, with the result that variations in language
and method of presentation crept in. Indeed, by 1979 it was almost impossible to
tell what precisely was in the MBCA and what was not, since one had to root
around in various Business Lawyers in order to locate each amendment. The sec-
ond major reason was that there was considerable dissatisfaction with the publica-
tion called Model Business Corporation Act Annotated (2d ed.), which it had been
hoped would be a modest money-maker but in fact did not sell well at all due to the
form of the presentation and the lack of authoritativeness of much of the commen-
tary in those volumes. It seemed logical to combine the revision of this supplemen-
tal book with a project to revise and update the underlying statute.
There were other complaints with the 1969 version of the Model Act as well. In
1979, an Overview Committee within the Committee on Corporate Laws re-
viewed the entire Act and highlighted a number of problems in specific sections.
The language was sometimes turgid and complex. Obsolete practices, such as
closing the transfer books in advance of a shareholders' meeting, continued to exist
in the statute. The overall organization of the statute, which was based on the or-
ganization of the 1931 Illinois Business Corporation Act, left much to be desired:
for example, the process of incorporation was dealt with only after numerous pro-
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visions detailing the internal structure of a corporation. Some provisions - such as
requiring a judicial determination before a corporation could be involuntarily dis-
solved for failing to pay state taxes - had not been accepted by any jurisdiction and
were clearly unrealistic. And, finally, there were many sections and areas of the
Model Business Corporation Act that had never been reconsidered by the Com-
mittee since 1950 and it was felt that an overall reexamination was overdue.
The original plan was to do a general updating and revision of the language of
the MBCA, without undertaking large-scale substantive revisions. Many mem-
bers of the Committee were basically satisfied with the familiar Model Act and
resisted proposals for more significant change. What finally came out of the proc-
ess, however, was a major substantive revision that was basically a new statute, a
result that surprised many of the original participants in the process.
D. The Committee's Normal Development Process
The Committee on Corporate Laws generally works through subcommittees or
working groups that are created on an ad hoc basis to consider discrete problem
areas when they are identified as possible subjects for Committee consideration.
The subcommittee, usually consisting of three or four persons, may meet or have
discussions by conference telephone. Then the Chairman or another Committee
member usually prepares discussion memoranda, and where appropriate drafts
possible amendments to the Model Act to address the problem. The decisional
process is a gradual one, progressing through two or three different "readings" be-
fore the full Committee takes final action. Discussions of proposed amendments
might consume a couple of hours of Committee time at two or three successive
meetings. It is a leisurely process, with usually at least twelve months elapsing be-
tween the time a proposal is first placed on the agenda for preliminary discussion
and the time final approval is given to a proposed amendment addressing the prob-
lem.'
E. The Committee's Process Followed in the
Development of the RMBCA
When the decision to develop a new version of the MBCA was reached, and I
agreed to serve as the Reporter, consideration turned to the mechanics of drafting
the new version. The amendment process described in the preceding section was
not well suited to development of a new Act if it was to be completed within a rea-
sonable period of time. The development process threatened to be extremely time-
consuming; it was necessary to develop statutory language for more than 180
sections within a relatively brief period. It was essential that language be used
consistently throughout the statute, and that each section be subjected to a review
process within the Committee that assured that the background and experience of
7. On more complex issues, such as indemnification of directors, the duties of directors, and the statutory
right of dissent and appraisal, several years might elapse between the time the proposal is first discussed in pre-
liminary form and the time a formal amendment to the Model Act is approved.
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the members - the great strength of the Committee - was brought to bear on that
section. The impracticability of following the Committee's normal procedure
should be evident when it is recalled that it was not uncommon for the full Com-
mittee to spend more than six hours deliberating a single proposed amendment
ranging over some eighteen months. It was clearly impractical to increase the
number of Committee meetings, given the regular demands of the members' prac-
tice.
The procedure that was adopted was to centralize the drafting of all sections
and all official comments under my direction. Both initial drafts and final lan-
guage were handled the same way. Then, at the very least, if things did not mesh
properly, there was no doubt where the blame lay and who had the responsibility
to fix it.' I should add that I was assisted in this process by Seth Searcy, an Austin
lawyer and a highly skilled statutory draftsman, who was able to take complex
ideas and express them in clear and readable statutory language.' Indeed, his abil-
ity to take the language of the old Model Business Corporation Act and simplify it
while preserving its meaning was invaluable. Almost all of the work on the statute
and the Official Comments was done by Searcy and me. The project ran for nearly
five years and ultimately cost the American Bar Association and American Bar
Foundation about $375,000.10
The development of the RMBCA can be divided into two broad stages: the first
was the creation of the Exposure Draft which was published in the Spring of 1983,
and was widely circulated for comment. The second was the consideration of the
hundreds of comments received on this draft and the development of the final stat-
ute, which is what Mississippi enacted.
The Exposure Draft was prepared substantially as follows: The Committee on
Corporate Laws created subcommittees to consider each tentatively reorganized
chapter of the new Act. A rough draft of proposed textual revisions was created
and presented to the subcommittee in a form that permitted direct comparison (on
the same page) of the proposed language of the new statute and the corresponding
language in the 1969 version of the MBCA, as amended. Changes were largely
stylistic and simplifying; suggestions made by the 1979 Oversight Committee
were incorporated in these earlier drafts, and in some instances, I proposed minor
substantive changes. The proposed language and policy changes were debated at
length by each subcommittee, which itself often made numerous substantive and
stylistic changes. After this subcommittee review, the proposed chapter was pre-
sented for first reading to the full Committee along with the comparable language
of the current Model Act. After sometimes-extended debate (in which what I
thought was beautifully phrased and crystal-clear language was sometimes torn to
8. Technical amendments to fix minor glitches were made in 1987. Committee on Corporate Laws, Techni-
cal Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 42 Bus. LAW. 603 (1987).
9. The project also hired an attorney, a secretary, and a number of students to assist in the preparation of
annotations for the third edition of Model Business Corporation Act Annotated.
10. Most, if not all, of this investment has been recouped from royalties, principally from the third edition of
the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated.
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shreds), the proposed chapter would be approved in principle. At this stage, drafts
of proposed official comments were prepared by me, and the revised statute and
first draft of the Comments were returned to the subcommittee, where they were
again reviewed, approved, and presented for further consideration "on second
reading" by the full Committee. At this stage, drafts of chapters (and in some in-
stances, individual sections) were circulated outside the Committee to interested
individuals and organizations," and some drafts were circulated to persons who
requested them. Each chapter was then again revised and submitted, subject to
further debate, amendment, and revision to the full Committee for "final reading."
As the Exposure Draft was being created, specific chapters were of course in
different phases of the review process at the same time. For example, at a single
meeting of the Committee, Chapter One might be ready for third reading, while
Chapter Six had been presented for second reading at an earlier meeting and was
ready to be reconsidered by the full Committee, while Chapter Ten was at the
stage of first reading before the Committee. The Committee members, in addition
to their subcommittee responsibilities, also had to read drafts of chapters prepared
by other subcommittees. Different colored paper was used in notebooks to assist
Committee members in keeping straight the stage of each chapter.
The drafting process continued from 1980 through the end of 1982, when the
sixteenth and seventeenth chapters were finally approved. At this time more than
1,000 copies of the Exposure Draft were circulated to academics, practitioners,
trade associations, and other individuals and groups for comment.
The response to the Exposure Draft exceeded all expectations. More than 100
letters of comment were received, many several pages long and dealing with a va-
riety of subjects. Rather surprisingly, many of the comments were not limited to
the text of the Exposure Draft: rather, many were quite substantive and some
urged massive changes in traditional corporate statutory principles or approach.
Many comments were highly complimentary of the quality of the new statute;
some were mildly or extremely negative. 12
After the close of the comment period, the Committee considered what to do
about the comments. Even though many of the substantive proposals had consid-
erable support in principle from members of the Committee, it was recognized
that we could not now prepare a statute that incorporated many of the substantive
suggestions. We would have had to virtually start over; we had to build from the
Exposure Draft, not start anew. The Committee resolved to reconvene the sub-
committees so that they could review the proposals and comments, placing them
into three categories: (1) those not desirable to make; (2) those desirable to make if
practical; and (3) those desirable to make in principle, but required additional con-
sideration and should be put off until another day.
11. For example, drafts of chapter one were submitted to a sampling of filing authorities for their comment;
chapter five was submitted to several corporation service companies, and so forth. Provisions relating to voting
of shares were also submitted to the Society of Corporate Secretaries.
12. Several academics criticized specific portions of the Exposure Draft as being too "permissive" or insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the possibility of abuse. By and large, these comments were not accepted by the Committee.
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There followed a period that was even more frantic than the development of the
Exposure Draft. It was clearly desirable for either me or Searcy to attend each
meeting of each subcommittee since we had a much better idea than the subcom-
mittee members as to the complexity of implementing many of the suggested
changes. Meetings of subcommittees were held at irregular intervals or on Satur-
days in various cities. Gradually we hammered out both the principles and the
statutory language to effectuate the changes that were decided to be included.
Many of the most significant innovations in the RMBCA were made during this
period: for example, the elimination of the "money paid, labor done, or property
actually received" standard for eligible consideration for issuance of shares, and
the introduction of the concept of "voting groups" to straighten out the class voting
rules for classes and series of shares.
During this entire period-from 1979 through 1984, when the RMBCA was
finally approved -the only project that the Committee on Corporate Laws had
was the development of the new statute. Many members spent a great deal of time
in commenting on drafting efforts and making suggestions as to how the provi-
sions might be simplified and clarified. It was not uncommon for me to receive
several long letters a week from Committee members commenting on drafts of
sections and proposing improvements. I have no idea of how many volunteer, un-
compensated hours were put in by the Committee members and sometimes their
associates and partners, but it must have numbered in the tens of thousands of
hours that otherwise would have been compensated at very gaudy hourly rates.
The real cost of the development project was not the $375,000 of outside costs that
were incurred; it was the millions of dollars worth of free time donated by these
senior partners in major law firms in making sure that the statute was the best that
it could be.
III. WHY DO SOME STATES "Go IT ALONE"?
Mississippi attorneys may be interested in the reception other states have given
the RMBCA. As of June, 1990, fifteen states had adopted the RMBCA substan-
tially in its entirety as Mississippi has done. There may have been one or two since
then that have also adopted the RMBCA. But these "substantially complete" adop-
tions are not the whole story about the impact of the RMBCA. A number of states,
such as Maryland and Texas, have not completely revamped their corporation stat-
utes but have made significant amendments to specific sections and have adopted
much of the RMBCA language. Hence the single datum-fifteen states have
adopted the RMBCA in the last seven years - understates the influence of the Act.
States considering the revision of their corporation statutes have basically two
choices: they can follow the RMBCA or they can "go it alone."13 In making this
choice, the single most important factor appears to be the size of the corporate bar
13. They can also copy the Delaware statute for whatever benefit that provides, in terms of attracting new
incorporation and providing a strong base of decisional law for the benefit of their corporations. So far as I know,
the only state recently to follow this approach is Oklahoma.
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within the state, though there certainly is no direct correlation between the extent
of the RMBCA's acceptance and the size of the state. In practically every state, the
corporate statute is a product of the state bar. Typically, amendments to corpora-
tion statutes -or the decision to adopt a complete revision of corporation stat-
utes-are made by a committee of the state bar and presented to the state
legislature. At the very least, in practically every state, enactment of amendments
to corporate statutes requires the active support of, or at least the absence of objec-
tion from, the corporate segment of the state bar.14
The development of a state corporation statute "from scratch" basically requires
the assistance of a large number of experienced corporate practitioners to assist in
the development of the statutory language, and, equally importantly, to review the
product of the statutory draftsman and make sure that hidden or unsuspected prob-
lems do not lurk in the statutory language. I have discovered from personal experi-
ence that it is very easy for a single individual to draft provisions that appear
reasonable but which create serious unanticipated problems in situations not con-
sidered by the draftsman. The larger, more commercially important states, clearly
have the capacity within their state bars to develop a sophisticated and workable
corporation statute. In this category I would place not only the very largest states
such as California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, but also states of
more moderate size such as Washington, Indiana, Virginia, Florida, and Massa-
chusetts.
Several states seem clearly committed to a "go it alone" approach. The clearest
example is Delaware, the clear leader in the incorporation race, with a large and
extremely sophisticated corporate bar. California, New York, and Pennsylvania
also seem to be clearly committed to their individual corporation statutes.
What is particularly heartening to me, as the Reporter for the original
RMBCA, is that in many of these states in which the capacity to develop new cor-
poration statutes "from scratch" is clearly available, the state bar has opted to ei-
ther adopt the RMBCA or to follow it closely in most respects. Virginia, Indiana,
Illinois, and Georgia are good examples. Apparently what is happening is that
state bar committees in these states are reviewing the RMBCA and concluding
that the statute is basically satisfactory so that it is not necessary to "reinvent the
wheel."
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RMBCA AND THE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT
The American Law Institute commenced a major study called the Corporate
Governance Project at about the same time as the Committee on Corporate Laws
commenced the project that led to the development of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act. As many of you are doubtless aware, the Corporate Governance
14. As with all comments there are exceptions. Alaska recently adopted a new corporation statute that was the
product of its code revision commission with the assistance of an adviser who was a law professor from Califor-
nia. The state bar was successful in obtaining a number of amendments to the original commission draft before its
enactment. Many of the provisions in the Alaska statute are similar to those in California statutes.
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Project has been intensely controversial within the Institute and appears to be ap-
proaching completion in 1992. It has produced some ten "Tentative Drafts" of pro-
visions that have been debated extensively and heatedly on the floor of the ALI for
a decade.
The ALl project, of course, is not connected with the Committee on Corporate
Laws, though practically all members of the Committee are also members of the
ALI and many of them have participated actively in the floor debates. Even after
the RMBCA was finally approved in 1984, the Reporters of the Corporate Gov-
ernance Project have continued to forge their own solutions to many of the prob-
lems that are also addressed in the RMBCA. The likely outcome of the ALI
process, in other words, is another legislative-like document covering many of the
same issues as the RMBCA but offering solutions and language that differ from
that statute.
Among the areas that do appear to involve different standards are: (1) proce-
dures to be followed in dealing with conflicting interest transactions; (2) the effect
of the decision of an independent litigation committee recommending that deriva-
tive litigation not be pursued; and (3) the scope of permissible indemnification of
directors and officers. However, I would not make too much of these differences at
the present time.
One issue on which significant disagreement between the RMBCA and the
Corporate Governance Project may exist is the desirability of the "alternative con-
stituencies" statutes that have been so popular (and which Mississippi has en-
acted). These statutes provide that in making decisions affecting the corporation,
the board of directors is authorized to consider the interests of creditors, employ-
ees, customers, communities, and the like. The Committee on Corporate Laws
has clearly taken the position that these statutes are undesirable since they depart
from the traditional notion that the ultimate goal of the corporation is to maximize
the value of the shares for the benefit of the owners of the corporation."5
The position of the American Law Institute on alternative constituency statutes
is much murkier. There is no question that the Reporters to the Corporate Govern-
ance Project-primarily academics but also including one well-known practi-
tioner-agree entirely with the Committee on Corporate Laws in this regard.16
At the plenary annual meeting of the ALI in the Spring of 1990, however, the
body of the Institute adopted an amendment to language of a later Tentative Draft
that appears to authorize consideration of non-shareholder interests in formulating
policies with respect to takeover attempts. The amendment changed the test for de-
15. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 5, at 2253. A more elaborate analysis of these statutes reach-
ing the same conclusion appears in John Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time
Should Never Have Come, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1989, at 20. Mr. Hanks is a member of the Committee on Corporate
Laws.
16. The Reporters of the Corporate Governance Project have suggested that most of these alternative constitu-
ency statutes may be construed as being consistent with the principle that the primary obligation of the directors
is to benefit the shareholders, and alternative constituencies may be considered only when doing so creates no
conflict with this primary duty. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1990).
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fensive actions in the takeover context from "the best interests of the shareholders"
to "the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."' 7 The vote that
adopted this amendment was relatively close; immediately following the vote, the
Reporters announced that they could not support the amendment and did not know
how a standard could exist for the benefit of "the corporation" in contradistinction
to the benefit of its "shareholders." The ALl then approved a motion referring the
entire matter to the Reporters for further consideration and requested that the is-
sue be reconsidered at its next plenary session in May, 1991. At this session, how-
ever, the Reporters accepted the formulation approved at the plenary session the
previous year.
I was present at the very confusing discussion in 1990 (and indeed I voted with
the majority, much to the surprise of some of my academic colleagues). I do not
view this vote as a general endorsement of the "alternative constituencies" ap-
proach, and indeed, it is not at all clear what the language that was adopted really
means. So far as I personally am concerned, I viewed my vote in 1990 as extend-
ing no further than the takeover context, and then as doing no more than rejecting
the notion that the directors always have a duty to accept the highest price in the
contested takeover context. I do not know what motivated the other 200 plus
members who voted the way I did. Indeed, no one will know what this vote por-
tends until it is codified in a written ALI study, report, or recommendation. In-
deed, with the collapse of the takeover movement in the 1990's the whole issue
seems increasingly academic.
V. MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
I am turning now briefly to miscellaneous questions that have been presented to
me today by Mississippi lawyers. I will set forth each question or issue directly,
and then give my reaction to it. It must be understood, obviously, that I am speak-
ing as an individual, and these comments are in no sense comments by the Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, the ABA, or anyone else with any authority in the
matter.
A. What are the Practical Effects of the
Elimination of Traditional Terminology, Such
as "Common", "Preferred" 'Treasury Shares,
etc. When Accounting for Equity on a
Corporation's Balance Sheet?
I do not think the elimination of these terms in the statute has any necessary
practical effects at all on accounting for equity. For many years, Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") principles and accounting conventions
resulted in financial statements departing widely from the language of the state
17. As amended, § 6.02(a) of the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT reads as follows: "(a) The board of direc-
tors may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer [§1.32(a)], unless
the action would materially disfavor the long-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders." Id. (empha-
sis added).
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corporation statutes that specified a set of rules for accounting for equity, e.g.,
"stated capital," "capital surplus," and "earned surplus." The elimination of the
traditional terminology in the statute obviously does not mean that one cannot use
the description, e.g., "preferred stock" if one wants to, particularly if the stock has
designated preferences. The elimination of these terms in the RMBCA was de-
signed to increase flexibility-to permit the creation of novel types of securities
that might not fit neatly into the common/preferred categories. It should have no
effect at all on traditional common or preferred shares, or how they are accounted
for in financial statements.
I think that the most important practical effects of the RMBCA on accounting
for equity do not lie in the elimination of these traditional terms, but rather in the
elimination of par value, authorization of the issuance of shares for promissory
notes or contracts for future services, and Section 6.40, amending the limitations
on dividends and distributions. I do not think these changes have any significant
impact on the substance of what could lawfully be done under earlier statutes, but
they should simplify preparation of financial statements.
The elimination of the concept of treasury shares -they are treated as autho-
rized but unissued shares under the RMBCA - should simplify accounting for eq-
uity since it is no longer necessary to show treasury shares as a contra item on the
right hand side of the balance sheet, and to show a restriction on surplus. Rather
surplus or capital may be directly reduced by the amount of the consideration paid
to reacquire the shares. Again, I do not think that the RMBCA changes the sub-
stance of what could be done before, though the accounting for it should be differ-
ent.
B. What Triggers Class Voting?
Class voting in the RMBCA is called "voting by voting groups."18 It basically is
triggered either by an amendment to the articles of incorporation, or by a merger
or share exchange, that changes the rights of some shareholders in any of the ways
designated in Section 10.04 of the RMBCA. 19 Class voting is not required in con-
nection with sales of all or substantially all the assets of the corporation not in the
ordinary course of business.
Voting by voting groups is available only for entire classes or series of shares.
This type of voting is not available, for example, to those who are "cashed out" in a
transaction in which some of the common shareholders are cashed out.
Class voting, of course, may always be granted as a matter of contract by appro-
priate provisions in the articles of incorporation.
18. This change in terminology was made because of drafting considerations following the decision to recog-
nize series (as well as classes) as having the right to vote separately in some circumstances. To use "class voting"
when referring to a series voting separately when the series was part of a "class" that did not have the right to vote
separately was just too confusing.
19. While Section 10.04 of the RMBCA only relates to amendments to articles of incorporation, the same
voting pattern is required for mergers and related transactions by Section I 1.03(0.
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C. How do Directors'Elections Work?
The reason for the plurality requirement is to take into account the possibility
that three or more factions may each be seeking to elect a slate of directors, so that
no single candidate will get a majority of the votes cast.20 The rule is simply that
the candidates with the greatest number of votes are elected independently of
whether voting is straight or cumulative; in the absence of a tie, there is no run-off
in the event no one gets a majority. The ones with the most votes are elected.
Presumably, the form of ballot will reflect the names of the candidates who have
been nominated by the various factions of shareholders. There must also be in-
structions as to how the total number of votes each shareholder may cast may be
divided among the candidates by each voting shareholder: if the voting is cumula-
tive, each shareholder may spread the total number of votes he or she has (the
number of shares multiplied by the number of positions to be filled) over one or
more candidates; if the voting is straight, a shareholder may vote the number of
shares he has for one or more candidates but may not cast more votes for any one
candidate than the number of his shares. 21 For example, in a straight election, a
shareholder with 100 shares may place 100 votes on as many candidates as there
are positions to be filled; a shareholder owning fifty shares may cast fifty votes for
each of three candidates. Since candidates are elected on the basis of those with a
plurality of votes, in a straight election, a majority shareholder will elect the entire
board and the minority shareholder will be entirely deprived of representation.
D. Does a Court of Equity have the
Power to Impose Remedies Other than Actual
Dissolution or Some Form of Custodianship?
As approved in 1984, the RMBCA basically only recognized involuntary dis-
solution as a remedy for oppression, deadlock, abuse of power, fraud, or waste of
corporate assets.22 A much broader list of available remedies appeared in the
Close Corporation Supplement, but that statute has not been adopted in Missis-
sippi (or in most other states, for that matter). So far as I know, no consideration
was given by the Committee on Corporate Laws in 1984 to the question of
whether other remedies short of involuntary dissolution might be appropriate in
specific cases.
20. All elections for directors are run on an "at large" basis- one votes in favor of candidates (much as in a
political election) rather than a slate of directors. If there are three contending factions, and each votes for their
own candidates, the plurality rule determines who is elected without the need for a runoff. If there are three di-
rectorships to be filled, the top three vote getters are elected. Where only two factions are contending for places
on the board of directors, the plurality language becomes virtually identical to the older "majority" language in
earlier statutes.
21. For example, if a shareholder owns 100 shares and there are three directors to be elected, in cumulative
voting the shareholder may cast up to 300 votes for one candidate, or he may divide up the votes among more than
one candidate as he or she wishes. In straight voting, the shareholder may cast a maximum of 100 votes for any
one candidate, and may cast 100 votes for each of three candidates.
22. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30 (1984).
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In 1991, the Committee on Corporate Laws approved major amendments to the
RMBCA dealing with judicial dissolution. As you may know, courts in a number
of states have judicially determined that they have power to grant relief other than
dissolution in cases of oppression, etc., even under statutes that expressly autho-
rize only dissolution or custodianship.23 The remedy usually granted in these cases
is a mandatory buyout. The 1991 RMBCA amendments expressly create a buyout
remedy after a lawsuit seeking involuntary dissolution is filed. Involuntary disso-
lution is still the ultimate remedy if the terms of the buyout cannot be worked out.
I might observe that the original RMBCA merely says that the court "may"
grant dissolution in cases of oppression, etc., and there is certainly nothing in the
statute that expressly precludes alternative remedies that may be less disruptive
than dissolution, if the court wishes to consider such remedies. I assume, there-
fore, that a court is not precluded from doing so under the RMBCA, whether or
not the state has adopted the new section 14.34.
E. Why is There No Specified "Drop Dead"Date
in the Dissolution Process?
I personally argued in favor of a "file only at the end of the dissolution process"
rule in order to establish a fixed date at which the voluntary dissolution process has
ended. At this time, the corporate existence would end, the time period for post-
dissolution suits would begin to run, and the corporate name would again become
available for general use. The Texas statute handles dissolution in this way, but I
was unable to persuade the subcommittee that this was the best way to go, since
some subcommittee members were familiar with "file at the beginning of the proc-
ess" statutes. The "file at any old time" provision in the present RMBCA was basi-
cally an acceptance of the notion that one first filed and then completed the
dissolution process. I later raised this issue before the full Committee, but was un-
able to persuade them that the subcommittee had made a mistake. I should add,
this issue arose very near the end of the process of reviewing comments, and the
Committee was rushing to complete its review of the proposed statute. I think the
present RMBCA is less than satisfactory in this respect.
E What is the Effect of Reinstatement for an Administratively
Dissolved Corporation? Why Does the Model Act not
Contain a Similar Provision for a Foreign Corporation
that has had its Qualification to do Business
Administratively Revoked?
The theory of the RMBCA is to encourage reinstatements (since the goal is to
get state taxes paid, annual reports filed, etc.) and not to punish negligent conduct.
If reinstatement occurs, "it relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of
the administrative dissolution and the corporation resumes carrying on its busi-
23. E.g., McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Balvik v. Sylvester,
411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W2d 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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ness as if the administrative dissolution had never occurred.'24 I assume that this
language means that shareholders are not personally liable for corporate obliga-
tions incurred in the interim, that actions by directors and officers in the interim
are viewed as corporate actions rather than individual ones, and so forth.
The fact that the RMBCA does not contain a similar provision for foreign cor-
porations is an oversight. The omission was never raised or discussed, so far as I
know.
G. Are There Any Practical Problems Arising from the
Fact that the Same Individual May Serve as Both
President and Secretary of the Corporation?
I believe that a majority of the states provide today that an individual may serve
simultaneously in several different corporate offices, including President and Sec-
retary. I am not aware that this has given rise to any particular problem. The only
problem I can foresee arising is if one is dealing with a title examiner, bank officer,
or other person who was brought up in the old school and believes that a document
is not valid unless it is signed on behalf of the corporation by two different per-
sons.
It is my impression, on the other hand, that it is common in multi-person cor-
porations to have the President and Secretary be different persons, even in states
that permit the two offices to be held by the same person. After all, why do some-
thing that might create a hassle when it is not necessary to do so?
H. Is There Any Difference Between a Certificate of Existence
and a Certificate of Good Standing?
As I recall, the decision was made to use the phrase "Certificate of Existence""
rather than "Certificate of Good Standing" in order to make clear that the Secre-
tary of State who issues that certificate was doing so only upon an examination of
his or her own records and was not making a government-wide survey of all legal
requirements for a corporation (as a "Certificate of Good Standing" arguably im-
plies). In many states, for example, no procedure exists by which the Secretary of
State may routinely determine from the comptroller or organization charged with
collection of taxes other than franchise taxes that the corporation is "in good stand-
ing" under those other tax statutes. The change in name was made only to reflect
the reality of what such certificates in fact cover in many states.
L May Incorporators Issue Stock Under Section 2.05(a) (1),
or May the Issuance of Shares Only be Accomplished by
Action of the Board of Directors (Which Seems to be
Contemplated by Section 6. 21) ?
The intention was that only directors may authorize the issuance of stock. If the
persons forming a corporation wish to have the incorporator authorize the issu-
24. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORp. AcT § 14.22(d) (1984).
25. REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. Acr § 1.28 (1984).
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ance of stock, the incorporator must also be named as the sole initial director un-
der Section 2.02(b)(1), and the initial director should organize the corporation
under Section 2.05(a)(1), during which "meeting" he can authorize the issuance of
stock. The theory of this is that the issuance of stock should be made by a person or
group who owes fiduciary duties to the shareholders, and that therefore directors
should do it rather than incorporators. The flexibility of the organization provi-
sions of the RMBCA permit this to be done at a single meeting.
J. How Does the RMBCA Handle "Fairness"Issues in
Cash-Out Mergers and Share Exchange?
The RMBCA does not refer expressly to fiduciary duty or fairness require-
ments in connection with these transactions, which clearly have abusive or op-
pressive potential. However, the official comment to Section 11.01 does refer
specifically to the case law holding that in some circumstances these transactions
may constitute breaches of fiduciary duty. The expectation certainly is that these
fiduciary duties will be held to apply under the RMBCA as part of the rules relat-
ing to self-dealing transactions, but I do not believe there is any case yet that has
addressed this issue.
There is also a right of dissent and appraisal in connection with most of these
transactions, and that provides an alternative protection to minority shareholders
in many cases.
K. What is the Relationship Between Section 16. 02
and the Common Law on Shareholder Inspection Rights?
The extent to which common law shareholder inspection rights exist at all, and
the extent to which they continue to exist under present corporation statutes, are
both very unclear questions in most states. These issues were discussed at some
length by the subcommittee considering Chapter 16 of the RMBCA, and the con-
clusion was reached that whatever common law right existed should not be af-
fected by Chapter 16 of the RMBCA. In other words, a common law right is not
preempted by the RMBCA, but that statute also does not expressly recognize such
a common law right. This rather Olympian conclusion is rather neatly (I think) set
forth in section 16.02(e).
This section does not affect:
(a) the right of a shareholder to inspect records under section 7.30 or, if the share-
holder is in litigation with the corporation, to the same extent as any other litigant;
or
(b) the power of a court, independently of this Act to compel the production of cor-
porate records for examination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1984, the Committee on Corporate Laws has continued the process of re-
vising and updating the RMBCA. Mississippi has adopted many though not all of
these amendments. The principal amendments are:
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1) Subchapter F, dealing with self dealing transactions. Mississippi has enacted
this provision.
2) Amendment to section 2.20(b) authorizing articles of incorporation to limit
the monetary liability of directors. Mississippi has enacted this provision.
3) Amendment to section 6.40, excluding certain subordinated indebtedness
from the rules relating to distributions. Mississippi has enacted this provision.
4) Subchapter D, relating to derivative proceedings. Mississippi has not en-
acted these new sections designed to clarify the need for demand on directors and
the preclusive effect to be given to recommendations of litigation committees.
5) Section 7.32, relating to shareholder's agreements in closely held corpora-
tions. Mississippi has not enacted this provision which was approved by the Com-
mittee in the Spring of 1991, and has not been widely distributed.
6) Section 14.34, relating to an option to purchase shares in lieu of involuntary
dissolution. Mississippi has not enacted this provision which was also approved by
the Committee in the Spring of 1991, and has not been widely distributed.
I believe that relatively small states (such as Mississippi) are well served in the
corporate area by the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. The Committee
on Corporate Laws has continued to address major problems of corporate law and
has provided statutory language that is well-drafted and carefully reviewed to
make sure that it strikes a reasonable balance among the various interests within a
corporation.
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